Demand for Self Control: A model of Consumer Response to Programs and Products that Moderate Consumption

Is it better to apply effort to increase personal consumption, or control what one wants? The model presented here provides a characterization of demand for self control, namely, its responsiveness to price and risk. Unlike most other models of self control, the model does not identify self control with time inconsistency or rely on the multiple-selves framework. Self control refers to resources allocated to preference transformation technology enabling consumers to moderate desire for ordinary consumption by reducing threshold levels required to achieve goals or target-levels of consumption. Consumers face a choice between allocating resources toward increasing expected levels of consumption or increasing chances of contentment through self control. Because of strong income effects, demand for self control turns out to be non-monotonic in price and sometimes discontinuous, revealing potential for unanticipated and sometimes surprisingly large responses to small changes in price. The model is used to analyze consumers’ willingness to follow new regulations, take up credit counseling, enroll in financial literacy programs, and purchase products aimed at improving financial decision making through cultivation of self control.Preference Choice, Preference Change, Moderation, Restraint, Desire, Financial, Decision Making, Consumer Credit, Consumer Finance, Institutional Design, Ecological Rationality, Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics

Public monopoly versus mixed oligopoly: product differentiation and social efficiency

In this paper, we consider a mixed oligopoly market in which a public firm and private firms compete, in particular, in which private entrants are allowed to enter a monopoly market by a public incumbent who maximizes social welfare. It has been widely believed that the public firm has advantage over private firms because the former who maximizes social welfare can charge a lower price than the latter who maximizes its own profit. However, in a Hotelling model of product differentiation, we obtain the results that both the public firm and private firms charge the same price in equilibrium, and more importantly, that the equilibrium prices may rise as a result of competition, thereby lowering the consumer surplus, if the transportation cost is high enough. We also show that if a private firm enters the market by choosing its own degree of differentiation, it will prefer neither maximum differentiation nor minimum differentiation in the case that the public incumbent is myopic in the sense that it cannot anticipate entry as well as in the case that it is far-sighted enough to anticipate entry. This draws an important policy implication in the market of Korean housing guarantee services

case of relocation

Thesis(Master) --KDI School:Master of Public Management,2019‘Geographical relocation’ has been conducted to alleviate overcrowding and support balanced regional development in many countries. Recently, in Korea, the ongoing policy of relocating public organizations and building innovative cities were implemented in 2004 when the ‘Special Act on Balanced National Development’ was enacted. As of 2018, there were a total of 154 public institutions relocated. At a time when the effectiveness of the relocation should be measured, there has been little prior researches addressing job satisfaction and life satisfaction of relocators in the public sector in Asia. Thus, the aim of the study was to examine the determinants of job satisfaction and life satisfaction and correlation between the two different satisfactions. The study presented here investigated the following research questions: i) Does working conditions in the new workplace affect job satisfaction?; ii) Does interactivity in the new workplace affect job satisfaction?; iii) Does the social infrastructure in the new location affect life satisfaction?; iv) Does social activity in the new location affect life satisfaction?; v) Is there a correlation between job satisfaction and life satisfaction? The study collected data through an online survey and applied statistical analysis using factor analysis, regression, and ANOVA. The result of analysis support that of working condition variables, work system and development opportunity affect job satisfaction, and interactivity such as building relationship and building trust affect job satisfaction. When it comes to life satisfaction, both social infrastructure and social activity are influential factors. There was a positive correlation between job satisfaction and life satisfaction. The current study provides implications theoretically and managerially for future research on satisfaction of employees in the public sector in case of relocation.I. Introduction II. Literature Review III. Theoretical Background IV. Hypothesis Development V. Methodology VI. Data analysis VII. ConclusionsOutstandingmasterpublishedYoo Jeong KIM

Network Marketing on a Small-World Network

We investigate a dynamic model of network marketing in a small-world network structure artificially constructed similarly to the Watts-Strogatz network model. Different from the traditional marketing, consumers can also play the role of the manufacturer's selling agents in network marketing, which is stimulated by the referral fee the manufacturer offers. As the wiring probability $\alpha$ is increased from zero to unity, the network changes from the one-dimensional regular directed network to the star network where all but one player are connected to one consumer. The price $p$ of the product and the referral fee $r$ are used as free parameters to maximize the profit of the manufacturer. It is observed that at $\alpha=0$ the maximized profit is constant independent of the network size $N$ while at $\alpha \neq 0$, it increases linearly with $N$. This is in parallel to the small-world transition. It is also revealed that while the optimal value of $p$ stays at an almost constant level in a broad range of $\alpha$, that of $r$ is sensitive to a change in the network structure. The consumer surplus is also studied and discussed.Comment: 12 pages, to appear in Physica

‘Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?’: Revisited

We examine the effect of guaranteed lowest price clauses (G.L.P.). First, we correct the proof of Logan and Lutter’s main result that it is the unique equilibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to charge collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game, if one uses the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Second, we extend their argument to a sequential pricing game in which one firm chooses its price before the other, given that both firms adopt G.L.P. We show that collusive prices is the unique equilibrium outcome in this game even without resorting to any stringent refinement like the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

Meaning of Wearing Faux Fur

The purpose of this study is to Understand meanings of consuming faux fur from the perspective of consumer culture theory

Strategic delegation and second mover advantage in duopoly

We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one manager playing a multi-stage delegation game. The decision of each firm consists of two stages. In the first stage, the owner offers his manager a contract based on profits and sales. In the second stage, the manager chooses its output or price. Several possible sequential games will be analysed, depending on the sequence of the strategic variables. In the first scenario in which firm 1 makes a contract decision and a producing decision sequentially, and firm 2 follows in the same fashion, we show that any delegation equilibrium in which both owners commit their managers to profit-maximising behaviour disappears. In the second scenario in which the firms first enter into the contract stage and then Stackelberg competition follows in the second stage, sales-based delegation occurs. If firms compete in quantities, second mover advantage appears if firms make simultaneous delegation contracts, while first mover advantage is recovered if they make sequential contracts. If firms compete in prices, the results are reversed